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Abstract 
 
This paper is an overview of ―Agent-based Computational Economics‖ (ACE), an emerging 
approach to the study of decentralized market economies, in methodological perspective. It 
summarizes  similarities  and  differences  with  respect  to  conventional  economic  models, 
outlines  the  unique  methodological  characteristics  of  this  approach,  and  discusses  its 
implications for economic methodology as a whole. While ACE rejoins the reflection on the 
unintended  social  consequences  of  purposeful  individual  action  which  is  constitutive  of 
economics as a discipline, the paper shows that it complements state-of the-art research in 
experimental and behavioral economics. In particular, the methods and techniques of ACE 
have reinforced the laboratory finding that fundamental economic results rely less on rational 
choice  theory  than  is  usually  assumed,  and  have  provided  insight  into  the  importance  of 
market structures and rules in addition to individual choice. In addition, ACE has enlarged the 
range of inter-individual interactions that are of interest for economists. In this perspective, 
ACE  provides  the  economist‘s  toolbox  with  valuable  supplements  to  existing  economic 
techniques  rather than  proposing a  radical alternative. Despite  some open methodological 
questions, it has potential for better integration into economics in the future. 
 







Cet  article est une lecture méthodologique de l‘￩conomie computationelle orientée agents 
(Agent-based Computational Economics, ACE), une approche nouvelle à l‘￩tude d‘￩conomies 
de  marché  décentralisées.  L‘article  relève  ressemblances  et  différences  par  rapport  aux 
modèles conventionnels, appréhende les spécificités méthodologiques de l‘ACE, et en discute 
les implications pour la méthodologie économique générale. Ayant souligné que l‘ACE se 
rapproche de la réflexion sur les conséquences non intentionnelles de l‘action individuelle, 
constitutive de l‘￩conomie comme discipline, le papier montre qu‘il s‘agit d‘un complément à 
la recherche de pointe en économie expérimentale et comportementale. En particulier, l‘ACE 
a  renforcé  le  résultat  expérimental  que  certaines  propositions  centrales  de  l‘analyse 
￩conomique  d￩pendent  moins  de  la  th￩orie  du  choix  rationnel  que  l‘on  ne  le  croit 
habituellement, et a jet￩ de la lumi￨re sur l‘importance des structures et règles de marché. 
L‘ACE  a  aussi  élargi  le  champ  des  interactions  inter-individuelles  ayant  un  intérêt 
économique.  En  ce  sens,  l‘ACE  enrichit  la  boîte  à  outils  de  l‘￩conomiste  avec  des 
compléments aux techniques existantes, plus que proposer une alternative radicale. Malgré 
des  questions  méthodologiques  ouvertes, l‘ACE a la potentialit￩ de  mieux s‘int￩grer à la 
discipline économique à l‘avenir. 
 
Mots-clés : économie computationelle orientée agents, méthodologie économique, économie 
expérimentale.   3 
Agent-based Computational Economics: a Methodological Appraisal 
 
This  paper  is  an  overview  of  ―Agent-based  Computational  Economics‖  (ACE),  an 
emerging  approach  to  the  study  of  decentralized  market  economies,  in  methodological 
perspective. It summarizes similarities and differences with respect to conventional economic 
models, outlines the unique methodological characteristics of this approach, and discusses its 
implications for economic methodology as a whole. By so doing, the paper endeavors to 
contribute to the wider discussion on the promises and shortcomings of the new approach, 
which  is  already  lively  within  the  ACE  community  and  is  now  raising  interest  among 
economic methodologists and economists more generally.   
ACE uses computer-intensive tools and techniques in the study of economic problems, 
so that its models take the form of computer programs that can be run to simulate the behavior 
of  the  phenomenon  under  study.  Similarly  to  other  areas  of  research  in  computational 
economics, its rise has greatly benefited from the dramatic surge in calculation capacity of the 
last two decades. Yet it differs from the traditional core of computational economics, whose 
focus on the search for numerical solutions of equation-based models and the exploration of 
new  optimization  techniques  is  reflected  in  the  first  volume  of  the  Handbook  of 
Computational  Economics  (Amman,  Kendrick  and  Rust  (1996)).  Instead  ACE,  which  is 
central to the second volume of the Handbook (Tesfatsion and Judd (2006)), places emphasis 
on agents and the dynamics of their interactions and can be defined as ―the computational 
study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents‖ (Tesfatsion 
(2002)). 
While the earliest contributions to agent-based economic modeling date back to the late 
1980s (see e.g. Anderson, Arrow and Pines (1988)), the field has attracted growing attention 
in recent years as its areas of application have widened, a number of theoretical and empirical 
results have been obtained and tested, and a great deal of experience in this area has been 
accumulated.  In  the  wake  of  the  recent  crisis,  even  the  question  of  whether  agent-based 
computer models could help to better understand economic and financial systems and prevent 
another meltdown has surfaced (Colander et al. (2009), Buchanan (2009)). 
The  potential  and  possibilities  for  ACE  to  contribute  to  economic  knowledge  are 
discussed here through the lenses of three inter-related methodological questions: 
  What  does  ACE  change,  and  what  does  it  preserve  relative  to  traditional 
approaches to the study of decentralized market economies?   4 
  What are the distinctive methodological characteristics of ACE and where is it 
likely to head in the near future? 
  What  do  recent  developments  in  this  field  mean  for  the  methodology  of 
economics more generally? 
While it would be impossible to have the final word on all these issues in their multiple 
dimensions and their still evolving character, it is important at this stage of development of 
the field to assess the state of the art in the hope to provide elements for further reflection. 
It is a central argument of this paper that ACE rejoins the long-lasting reflection on the 
unintended  social  consequences  of  purposeful  human  action  and  their  potential  benefits, 
which has been at the heart of economics throughout its history, from Adam Smith‘s invisible 
hand  metaphor  to  modern  research  on  the  functioning  of  markets.  Admittedly,  this 
interpretation draws on the similarities between ACE and mainstream economics, but it does 
not overlook the differences, stressed by many practitioners of the field: rather, the paper 
suggests that ACE accompanies the process of transformation and renewal of the economics 
discipline that is already being pursued in other areas of research, notably experimental and 
behavioral  economics.  In  particular,  the  paper  insists  on  ACE‘s  role  as  a  complement  to 
laboratory  findings  on  individual  economic  rationality,  the  market  mechanism,  and  the 
linkages between the micro and macro levels of analysis.  
The place of the new approach within economics is still somehow controversial, as 
some ACE scholars openly challenge received wisdom and claim that theirs is a ―better way‖ 
to understand the behavior of economic systems and to guide policy-making (see e.g. Farmer 
and Foley (2009)), while many in the profession remain much more cautious. Nonetheless, 
the  paper  argues  that  ongoing  transformations  in  economic  methodology  are  likely  to 
consolidate the position of ACE in the years to come and to better integrate it into economics. 
As the discipline opens to a wider variety of methods and techniques ranging from statistical 
tools to software, experimental protocols, and neuro-imaging, ACE can be seen as a set of 
new, additional items for the economist‘s toolbox, which potentially complements existing 
ones without necessarily substituting for them.  
Finally, the paper discusses the multi-disciplinary origins of ACE and the strong ties 
that subsist between the ACE community and like-minded scholars in neighboring disciplines. 
It  emphasizes  the  benefits  of  inter-disciplinarity  which  can  enrich  economics  with  new 
research  questions,  variables  of  interest,  and  methods  of  analysis;  at  the  same  time,  it 
discusses  its  drawbacks,  as  closeness  with  other  disciplines  may  hinder  dialogue  with 
different parts of economics rather than enhancing it. In this sense, the paper emphasizes the   5 
need for ACE to strike a balance between the two opposing needs to maintain contact with 
other disciplines while still engaging in a constructive discussion with economics itself.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the main 
features of ACE and discusses similarities and differences with respect to previously existing 
work in economics in general, and in computational economics in particular. Based on that, 
the  second  section  outlines  the  methodological  features  of  this  approach,  its  most  recent 
developments, and the challenges it currently faces; special emphasis is on its experimental 
character, its approach to decision-making processes, validation and verification issues, and 
heterogeneity of model types and objects of study. Examples are mainly drawn from research 
on markets, even though ACE can be, and actually is, applied to various topics ranging from 
economic growth to  technological  change, use of natural  resources,  and the environment. 
Finally, the paper assesses the impact of ACE on the methodology of economics as a whole. 
The last section briefly concludes. 
 
1.  ACE as a subfield within Economics and Computational Economics 
This section first outlines the main characteristics of ACE. Focus is on similarities and 
differences with respect to received economic theories and, more specifically, computational 
economics. Then, the section briefly presents the major influences and the milestones that 
have marked the development of ACE, at the interface between economics and neighboring 
disciplines, and its subsequent, gradual acceptance as a legitimate field within economics. 
 
1.1  Similarities and differences 
In general terms, it can be said that ACE aims to explain aggregate regularities as so-
called  ―emergent‖  properties  of  an  economic  system,  arising  over  time  from  repeated 
interactions between autonomous, heterogeneous agents. Depending on the problem under 
study, the latter can be individuals or entities such as households, firms, and organizations. 
The notion of emergence refers to cases in which the whole cannot be taken as the sum of its 
parts:  put  differently,  individual  behavior  alone  is  insufficient  to  fully  predict  large-scale 
outcomes, and some understanding of how agents interact with one another is necessary to 
bridge the micro and macro levels of analysis. A typical example is the well-known urban 
segregation  model  developed  by  Thomas  Schelling  (1978),  in  which  a  weak  individual 
preference for having a minimum of less than half their neighbors of the same type (originally 
interpreted as ethnic group) ends up splitting agents into completely separated neighborhoods 
within which agents are all of the same type.   6 
In  turn,  it  is  acknowledged  that  aggregate-level  outcomes  may  induce  changes  in 
individual  behavior,  in  a  two-way  feedback  between  the  agent  and  the  system.  The 
perspective is clearly dynamic in the sense that the modeler first formulates hypotheses about 
the behavior of agents and their interactions with others, and then uses computer simulation to 
generate ―histories‖ that bring to light the implications of these hypotheses. Agents‘ behaviors 
and interactions usually depend on their past experience, and in many models, agents update 
their behavior based on that experience. This generates path-dependence, a property that can 
be related to heterogeneity of agents. Indeed even if the attributes of two agents are identical 
at the beginning, they may make different choices and evolve along distinct trajectories, so as 
to distinguish themselves progressively from each other (Rouchier 2008).  
With its focus on decentralized decision-making by a multitude of autonomous agents 
and the rise of non-fully-predictable macro-level regularities from micro-level actions, ACE 
echoes a conception of the market system that has always been at the heart of economics. It 
appears  as  a  form  of  comeback  to  the  long-lasting  reflection  on  the  unintended  social 
consequences of purposeful human action, with contributions ranging from Adam Smith‘s 
―invisible  hand‖  to  Hayek‘s  conception  of  the  economic  order  and  Walrasian  general 
equilibrium. While ACE prolongs this reflection, its ambition is to provide a new way to look 
at  the  ―mystery‖,  one  that  leaves  aside  the  equilibrium  conditions  that  older  economic 
approaches  used  to  impose  from  the  outside,  somewhat  artificially:  from  the  Walrasian 
auctioneer  to  common  knowledge  assumptions,  representative  agents,  and  rational 
expectations.  Today‘s  methodological  advances,  it  is  believed,  should  enable  to  truly 
decentralize decision-making. 
Despite this commonality, ACE‘s insistence on path-dependence and heterogeneity of 
agents reveals how profoundly different it actually is from mainstream economics. It is to 
some extent closer to evolutionary theory, which emphasizes adaptation of the individual to 
its environment and the development of inter-individual and inter-group variation. More to the 
point, standard utility maximization and perfect information assumptions are not normally 
present  in  ACE  models,  which  rather  tend  to  explore  alternative  notions  of  cognition, 
rationality,  and  learning.  Typically,  bounded  rationality  is  assumed  together  with  agents‘ 
capacity to revise their decisions as interaction plays out; central issues are the acquisition, 
accumulation and use of information at individual level, and the circulation of information at 
system level. Induction prevails over deduction in that agents move from their own specific 
experiences  to  broader  generalizations  through  learning  processes,  rather  than  deriving 
conclusions from given assumptions. This is also true for the modeler: a simulation run gives   7 
rise to one possible realization only and strictly speaking, results do not have the status of 
proofs; some form of generalization is only possible inductively if results are reproduced 
many  times  and  under  different  conditions.  Simulation  enables  to  identify  sufficient,  but 
generally not necessary, conditions for a phenomenon to emerge; in this sense, ACE is more 
similar  to  engineering  and  the  experimental  sciences  rather  than  to  deductive  logic  or 
mathematics. Accordingly, the core questions of ACE are closer to those of experimental and 
behavioral economics as well as (to some extent) game theory, than to those of neoclassical 
economics. It can thus be said that this approach participates to some extent in the ongoing 
renewal of the economic theory of individual behavior.  
With  respect  to  these  other  approaches,  the  specificity  of  ACE  is  its  focus  on 
interpersonal,  social  interactions  in  a  dynamic  perspective.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
motivations for economists to explore agent-based modeling include dissatisfaction not only 
with  utility  maximization  but  also  with  mainstream  economics‘  difficulty  in  deriving 
aggregate properties from individual behavior, the ―representative agent‖ being a particularly 
unsatisfactory solution (Kirman (1992)). Likewise, ACE‘s emphasis on the time factor can be 
seen as a response to the standard equilibrium approach and its inadequacy to deal with out-
of-equilibrium  situations.  Awareness  of  these  potential  strengths  is  widespread  among 
practitioners of the field, and is one of the reasons why some of them loudly promote ACE as 
a better alternative. 
Focus on agent interactions in a dynamic framework distinguishes ACE also from other 
types of computer-intensive work in economics; in a certain, definite sense, the fact that all 
use computers is only a loose analogy (Axtell (2000)). One may go as far as to say that 
computational techniques play only a small part in the definition of ACE: indeed Schelling‘s 
segregation model, widely considered as an important precursor of the field, was originally 
developed by simply moving dimes and pennies on a chessboard by hand. The relatively 
greater importance of agents and their interactions with respect to the use of computer-based 
tools is also reflected in the name that Leigh Tesfatsion, a major contributor to the field, 
initially proposed for it: it was simply ―ABE‖, agent-based economics. She later changed it to 
ACE for greater clarity, given that after all, there are some types of agents also in standard 
economic  models
1.  Be  that  as  it  may,  t he  similar  denomination  of  ABM  (agent-based 
                                                 
1 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/news0297.htm.   8 




1.2  The  multi-disciplinary  origins  of  ACE-ABM  and  its  integration  into 
economics 
This terminological duplicity reflects another specific trait of the field. While the ACE 
label  refers  explicitly  to  economics,  ABM  does  not  and  in  fact,  discloses  the  multi-
disciplinary origins of this approach. It is true that Schelling, an economist, was a pioneer in 
showing how the complex pattern of interactions among agents in society may give rise to 
unexpected collective outcomes. Other recognized influences, however, include John Holland, 
whose book on adaptation ((1975), 2
nd ed. (1992)), drew heavily on both evolutionary biology 
and  computer  science;  and  Robert  Axelrod,  a  political  scientist,  with  his  work  on  the 
emergence of cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner‘s Dilemma game (1984). The influence of 
complex systems physics has also been heavy, with the major role of the Santa Fe Institute 
(SFI) in bringing together economists and physicists (Anderson, Arrow and Pines (1988)) and 
the development of the closely related ―econophysics‖ research program (Rosser (2008)). At 
least in the early days of the SFI, the approach even had the ambition to provide a unifying 
perspective to the study of nature, human life, and society. Its development has also benefited 
from contributions of representatives of the wider social science, especially in Europe (Gilbert 
and Doran (1994); Gilbert and Conte (1995)). Today, agent-based models are applied in a 
variety of disciplines, including not only economics but also management, political science, 
sociology, anthropology, geography, biology, ecology, and even archaeology and linguistics. 
Agent-based  modelers  form  a  well  integrated  multi-disciplinary  community,  and  share 
common outlets for their publications such as Complexity, Advances in Complex Systems, and 
(especially in Europe) the web-based Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
3. 
While  honoring  its  multi-disciplinary  origins,  agent-based  modeling  has  aroused 
particular interest within economics since the early days, when the first SFI conference on 
―The Economy as a Complex System‖ was held in 1987, followed by the foundation of a new 
SFI economics program, and the publication of first research results in top journals (Arthur 
1991;  Holland  and  Miller  1991).  Support  from  renowned  economists  including  Kenneth 
Arrow, Alan Kirman,  and Axel  Leijonhufvud contributed to  progressively  reinforcing  the 
                                                 
2 The very term of ―agent‖ in its modern sense seems to have first appeared in an economics journal, namely the 
American Economic Review (Holland and Miller (1991)). 
3 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS.html.   9 
field. As early as 1996, Tesfatsion created a dedicated website
4, which she has maintained 
since then and is now a reference for agent-based modelers, especially in economics. ACE has 
gradually secured a place in  the Society for Computational Economics  and in specialized 
journals  (Computational  Economics,  Journal  of  Economic  Behavior  and  Organization, 
Games  and  Economic  Behavior,  Journal  of  Economic  Dynamics  and  Control),  while 
remaining  open  to  collaborations  with  like-minded  researchers  in  both  the  social  and  the 
natural sciences. Generalist journals ranging from American Economic Review to Journal of 
Political  Economy,  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  and  The  Economic  Journal  have 
occasionally  published  agent-based  models.  Though  ACE  has  not  quite  experienced  the 
extraordinary success of other emerging fields such as behavioral economics, it has stabilized 
as  a  subfield,  enjoys  increasingly  solid  reputation,  and  is  expanding  its  presence  in  both 
teaching and research programs worldwide.  
 
  
2.  The methodological characteristics of ACE 
To  identify  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  ACE,  this  section  first  provides  a  few 
introductory details on the underlying logic and founding principles of agent-based models. 
On this basis, it aims to derive questions for in-depth methodological discussion. Specifically, 
attention is drawn to four main issues, namely the interpretation of ACE as an experimental 
methodology;  the  choice  between  different  models  of  decision-making,  and  their 
methodological  implications;  validation  and  verification  issues;  and  finally,  diversity  of 
modeling approaches, assumptions, interpretations, and objects of study within ACE. 
 
2.1  The structure of an ACE model 
At a very basic level, most models share a similar structure, even though with some 
variation. Given a population of agents situated in a pre-defined environment and/or social 
context, at the heart of a model is their decision-making process. As a rule, agents‘ decisions 
are about possible exchanges or interactions with others and may include both the choice of 
an action (e.g. the quantity of a good to buy or sell) and the choice of a partner (e.g. a seller 
for a buyer, or a buyer for a seller); in other cases, instead, partners (buyers and sellers in this 
example) are matched randomly by the computer. Depending on the problem under study, the 
model may represent exchanges of goods or services but also communication, information-
                                                 
4 http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm   10 
sharing, advice-seeking, and other cognitive or social processes. As mentioned above, the 
individual decision-making process and the ensuing interactions between agents are iterated 
several times; at each step, past decisions and actions shape new choices and in some models, 
agents  change  their  behavior  progressively,  based  on  the  results  of  past  choices  and  the 
ensuing changes in the environment.  
The social context may take various forms: for example, it may allow agents to interact 
with any other agent or with a selected subgroup, which in turn may be defined spatially as a 
neighborhood or in terms of a network of ties, and may change in size and composition as a 
result of agents‘ actions over time. The choice set may be either given or gradually discovered 
as the agent acquires  and accumulates information, while choice-making rules may range 
from forms of strategic, rational behavior to some ―satisficing‖ criterion à la Simon and even 
to random choice, sometimes allowing for differences within the same population depending 
on the individual attributes of agents. Technically, many possibilities are open: for instance 
time  may  be  continuous  or  discrete,  choices  may  be  simultaneous  or  sequential,  and 
interactions may be bilateral or multilateral. It is the modeler who defines these and all other 
framing  aspects,  also  including  agents‘  attributes  and  the  state  of  the  system  at  time  0 
(initialization). The modeler also needs to specify in advance some indicators of the properties 
(of agents  and/or of  the system  as  a whole) that are  of interest for the investigation, for 
example patterns of transaction prices and quantities in a market model. 
Then, the modeler lets agents interact repeatedly over time and refrains from any further 
intervention,  typically  until  the  system  reaches  a  steady  state.  At  the  end,  the  modeler 
observes the values of indicators and derives from them answers to the questions under study. 
The  simulation  can  be  replicated  for  various  values  of  the  parameters  and  of  the  initial 
conditions so as to learn how to fine-tune the model to yield different results. This approach, 
which limits the participation of the modeler to the definition of the starting point and the 
rules of action, is often referred to as ―bottom-up‖ in that the final result depends only on 
agent  behavior  with  no  imposition  of  equilibrium  conditions  (market-clearing,  rational 
expectations, etc.) from the outside (―top-down‖). 
An important remark is that many aspects of the model, including the frame of action, 
parameters, and  detailed  behavioral  rules,  need  to  be specified;  yet the range of possible 
options is often very wide and, once standard rationality assumptions and externally-imposed 
equilibrium  conditions  are  removed,  little  guidance  comes  from  existing  economic 
knowledge. This is one of the main practical challenges for modelers and suggests that in a   11 
non-Walrasian framework of analysis and/or with non-fully-rational agents, microeconomic 
behaviors are still poorly understood and require further research.  
 
2.2  ACE as an experimental methodology 
Drawing  an  analogy  from  biology,  Tesfatsion  compares  the  bottom-up  approach  of 
ACE  to  a  ―culture-dish  laboratory  experiment‖  (2002).  More  generally,  she  and  other 
practitioners  of  the  field  propose  an  interpretation  of  it  as  an  experimental  methodology, 
exploiting  controlled  conditions  as  a  means  of  isolating  the  micro-level  sources  of 
macroeconomic phenomena. Running a computer simulation is to some extent comparable to 
performing an experiment and in fact, ACE is similar to experimental economics under many 
respects: both generate their own data, and may or may not compare them to external sources 
(survey  or  other);  both  rely  primarily  on  inductive  rather  than  deductive  reasoning;  and 
finally, both make extensive use of computers to record data and enable replication. Along 
these  lines,  agent-based  simulation  has  been  compared  to  the  use  of  ―computational 
laboratories‖, both  in  the social  sciences  in  general  (Dibble  (2001))  and in  economics in 
particular (Tesfatsion (2002); Duffy (2006)). 
ACE  is  not  fully  interchangeable  with  experimental  research  with  human  subjects, 
though: it cannot, say, test whether actual decision-makers violate rational choice theory, but 
it can provide insight into the possible consequences of an alternative behavioral assumption 
in a given social context. Indeed an experiment allows observing, and controlling, the actual 
object of study (for example, human decision-making criteria), while computer simulation 
should be conceived as an experiment  on  a model rather than on the phenomenon itself. 
Another difference is the focus of ACE on the macro effects of micro behavior, which is not 
always a concern, and is not always practically feasible, in laboratory experiments.  
While the analogy between ACE and experimental economics should not be pushed too 
far, the differences between them allow for potentially useful complementarities. Indeed a 
particularly promising direction of research consists in coupling ACE models with human 
subject  experiments  (Tesfatsion  (2002);  Duffy  (2006);  Contini,  Leombruni  and  Richiardi, 
(2006);  Rouchier  (2007)).  Laboratory  findings  can  provide  rich  information  on  agents‘ 
attributes, cognitive skills, and actual behavior; they thus contribute to designing and fine-
tuning the simulation. In turn, the latter can help to better understand results from experiments 
with  human  subjects,  for  instance  by  allowing  a  very  high  number  of  repetitions  of  an 
experiment, or by providing insight into the possible large-scale effects of some observed 
behavior, which would  be difficult  to  do in  the laboratory.  Agent-based models can also   12 
provide a benchmark: for example in market experiments, researchers can program software 
buyers and sellers to act according to some pre-specified rule, and compare simulated prices 
and quantities to those that prevail with human subjects in the lab. By so doing, they can 
assess similarities and differences between observed human behaviors and those implied by 
the rule under study, so as to gain further insight into decision-making processes. 
The similarities between agent-based modeling and experimental economics, and even 
more,  the  increasingly  diffused  practice  of  performing  parallel  experiments  with  human 
subjects and artificial agents, are among the reasons that account for the rise of ACE in recent 
years. To some extent, the sub-field participates in the success of experimental research and 
its perceived potential to enrich economic knowledge.   
 
2.3  Decision-making in ACE models 
To examine more closely the methodological specificity of ACE, with its strengths and 
weaknesses,  it  is  now  important  to  discuss  the  individual  decision-making  process.  As 
mentioned  above,  researchers  in  this  field  overwhelmingly  reject  neoclassical  utility 
maximization,  under  a  variety  of  influences  ranging  from  Herbert  Simon‘s  ―bounded 
rationality‖ approach to behavioral economists‘ claim that real decision-makers do not follow 
rational choice theory. The search for alternative models of rationality and cognition oscillates 
between the opposed principles of simplicity and complexity (Jager (2000), p. 102). They 
frame  the  extremes  on  a  continuum  and  many  researchers  adopt  intermediate  positions; 
nevertheless, debates among supporters of the two visions have often been lively, and for the 
sake of argument, it is useful to keep them separate. Simplicity has been widely popularized 
through Axelrod‘s KISS principle, which allegedly stands for the army slogan ―keep it simple, 
stupid‖, and is in fact a reformulation of Occam‘s razor. The idea is that as any other human 
being, the researcher has limited cognitive ability, so that it is crucial to understand everything 
that goes into the model in case a surprising result occurs. Simplicity at the agent level allows 
focusing on the dynamics of interactions among agents and on how they can, alone, lead to 
complex (and often, unexpected) outcomes at the aggregate level. In Axelrod‘s own words, 
―The point is  that  while the topic being investigated may  be complicated, the 
assumptions underlying the agent-based model should be simple. The complexity of 
agent-based modeling should be in the simulated results, not in the assumptions of the 
model‖ (2007). 
Simplicity is especially useful in models that need to separate out the effects of the 
structure and rules of interaction from those of individual behavior. In particular the so-called   13 
―Zero-Intelligence‖ agents research program on the functioning of markets, inaugurated by a 
seminal article by Gode and Sunder (1993), assumes random decision-making so as to obtain 
a high degree of simplicity at agent level, and exploits it to develop tractable models of the 
bearing of the institutional and regulatory structure on price formation. Random choice should 
not be taken as a truthful representation of human behavior, but rather as an attempt to isolate 
the  effects  of  the  market  structure  in  which  transactions  take  place.  With  this  approach, 
Sunder (2006a), (2006b), advocated a new direction of research, focusing more on institutions 
and structures than on the detailed study of micro behavior that in his view, characterizes 
much  of  today‘s  economics.  Along  similar  lines,  researchers  at  the  SFI  are  currently 
investigating  the  role  of  financial  institutions  in  shaping  the  price  formation  process, 
independently of the behavior of individual traders. 
Clearly,  a  drawback  of  simplicity  is  its  lack  of  realism.  This  is  not  necessarily  a 
concern:  the  ―as-if‖  arguments  used  in  economics  at  least  since  Milton  Friedman  (1953) 
suggest that even if its assumptions are unrealistic, a theory does not need to be rejected 
provided  its  predictions  are  not  contradicted  by  observation.  Yet  too  naïve  behavioral 
hypotheses may hinder the study of relevant issues, for instance in this case, the question of 
whether  and  how  traders  consent  to  abide  by  market  rules  and  may  even  contribute  to 
reshaping and improving them over time (Tubaro (2009)). 
A more realistic representation of individual decision-making requires some degree of 
complexity, endowing agents with relatively sophisticated behavioral and cognitive skills (see 
e.g. Conte and Paolucci (2001); Edmonds and Moss (2001); Sun and Naveh (2004); Sun 
(2006)). For instance, there might be a fitness or utility function that enables the agent to 
evaluate the consequences of its past actions and take them as a basis to improve its choice 
criteria (―learn‖), in a dynamic process. In more complex models, agents learn not only from 
their own experience but also from others, so that learning becomes a collective rather than an 
individual  process  (Vriend  (2000)).  Correspondingly,  learning  may  take  several  forms, 
ranging from relatively simple stimulus-response learning (Arthur (1991), (1993); Roth and 
Erev  (1995);  Erev  and  Roth  (1998))  to  more  sophisticated  belief-based  learning,  which 
requires an agent to form, and regularly update, beliefs on other agents‘ actions (Cheung and 
Friedman (1997)). Even more complex forms of learning that are found in the literature are 
genetic algorithms and classifier systems, borrowed from the principles of population biology 
(Holland (1992)). 
On the whole, research along these lines places less emphasis on cognitive limits, and 
rather stresses the inadequacy of rational choice theory in the case of complex or ill-defined   14 
problems  or  in  the  presence  of  widespread,  systemic  uncertainty  –the  typical  example  is 
chess, where deduction alone does not lead to a solution and other cognitive capacities such as 
induction  or  calculation  must  intervene  (Batten  (2000)).  Generally  speaking,  reliance  on 
complexity is relatively more widespread in the growing literature that addresses cognitive 
and information-related issues, often (though not always) relying on insight from psychology 
or  cognitive  science.  A  reason  for  concern,  though,  is  that  simulations  tend  to  be  less 
transparent under these conditions, and may make it difficult to clearly identify the dynamics 
that relate macro-level outcomes to micro-level behavior.   
 
2.4  Validation and verification 
Whether a modeler adopts simplicity or complexity, the question remains of what is an 
explanation in an agent-based model. How can computer simulation provide insight into a 
social phenomenon? In the early days of agent-based modeling, it was already a big step 
forward to generate a social phenomenon artificially: 
―What constitutes an explanation of an observed social phenomenon? Perhaps one 
day people will interpret the question, ‗Can you explain it?‘ by asking ‗Can you grow 
it?‘  Artificial  society  modeling  allows  us  to  ―grow‖  social  structures  in  silico 
demonstrating  that  certain  sets  of  microspecifications  are  sufficient  to  generate  the 
macrophenomena of interest‖ (Epstein and Axtell (1996), p. 20, italics in original). 
While  this approach allowed significant progress initially, many questions  remained 
open. How to ensure that the model captures salient dimensions of the problem under study, 
and reproduces relevant social processes? How to compare it to previously existing theories, 
and how to test its findings against empirical data? How to check for robustness of results to 
changes  in  parameter  settings,  initial  conditions,  and  software  implementation?  These 
questions  are  of  course  very  general  and  arise  with  virtually  every  modeling  approach; 
however,  they  are  all  the  more  challenging  in  the  particular  case  of  ACE,  in  that  path-
dependence  and  co-evolution  of  agent  behavior  and  the  environment  often  entail  non-
linearities or multiple equilibria, so that an analytical solution is hard or even impossible to 
find. As mentioned above, computer simulation does not provide proofs stricto sensu but only 
allows for inductive reasoning; simulation may even appear as a ―black box‖ in which the 
modeler  defines  the  inputs  (agents‘  attributes,  initial  conditions,  rules  of  interaction)  and 
observes the output (indicators), but may have limited understanding of the inner working of 
the system.   15 
Such issues are behind the reservations of many non-ACE economists, who feel on 
more solid ground with conventional mathematical and statistical models. In response, the 
ACE community has become progressively more aware of methodological problems and has 
devoted increasing attention to validation and verification,  with an exponential  growth of 
contributions  in  recent  years  (see  e.g.  Fagiolo,  Moneta  and  Windrum  (2007);  Fagiolo, 
Birchenham and Windrum (2007); Galán et al. (2009)). A full account of the whole range of 
discussions  pertaining  to validation would be outside the scope of this  paper, which will 
simply outline some of the main lines of reflection; the interested reader is invited to refer to 
the specialized literature. 
Broadly speaking, validation can be theoretical or empirical. The former is particularly 
appropriate in cases in which agent-based models are used for qualitative insight and theory 
generation, and basically consists in weighing model results against predictions derived from 
economic theory: for instance, the extent to which neoclassical supply-and-demand schemes 
are good predictors of decentralized market outcomes even if, say, exchanges do not follow 
tâtonnement rules, or agents do not maximize utility, can be assessed by comparing simulated 
prices and quantities to those that would prevail at the theoretical equilibrium point. Models 
with  Zero-Intelligence  agents  in  a  general  equilibrium  framework  are  a  case  in  point 
(Crockett, Spear and Sunder (2008)). 
Empirical  validation  can  take  several  forms,  but  a  common  approach  starts  from 
identifying  a set of  ―stylized facts‖ in the real  world,  that is,  following the definition  of 
Nicholas Kaldor, broad tendencies that summarize the empirical data, ignoring that individual 
detail may be subject to snags and qualifications; then, the modeler builds an agent-based 
environment and endeavors to reproduce the stylized facts jointly in the simulation. Thus, 
choice of parameter values will be such that the simulated result is closest to the observed 
facts; put differently, it is the output of the model that is subject to validation, rather than its 
inputs.  This  approach  is  particularly  appropriate  for  models  that  aim  to  explain  some 
persistently  observed  empirical  regularities,  for  instance  models  of  financial  markets 
(LeBaron  (2002);  Tesfatsion  (2008)).  One  problem  that  frequently  arises  with  output 
validation, however, is that different combinations of parameters and initial conditions may be 
consistent with the set of stylized facts of interest, so that some kind of validation is also 
desirable for the micro structure of the model. 
In fact validation may also concern inputs, especially for models that aim to design 
some  new  institutional  mechanism  or  rule,  in  a  normative  perspective;  in  such  cases, 
parameter  values  should  reproduce  the  observed  characteristics  of  individuals,  their   16 
interactions, and their local environment as closely as possible, so that the simulation can be 
trusted to yield plausible results. Examples of this type of research include design of matching 
mechanisms, of auctions (Sun and Tesfatsion (2006)), and of welfare benefit schemes (Pingle 
and Tesfatsion (2003)). However with input validation, it may be the case that parameters 
and/or initial conditions cannot be easily estimated, due to lack of sufficiently rich microdata: 
in  particular,  statistical  databases  very  rarely  include  any  details  on  decision-making  and 
learning rules (Fagiolo, Moneta and Windrum (2007)). 
One solution  consists, as  mentioned above, in  performing parallel  experiments  with 
artificial and human subjects. They can provide much richer information on agent attributes, 
cognitive skills, and behavior, than other data sources; they thus contribute to defining the 
appropriate specification of agent behavior and the parameters of agent-based models. Still 
another approach to validation is based on involvement of stakeholders (Barreteau (2003)). To 
address social dilemmas, typically local-level conflicts related to the collective use of natural 
resources such as land or water, the very people concerned are asked to participate to model 
building with their own knowledge and understanding of their social context. They provide 
information that contributes to shaping the model behavioral rules, attributes, and parameters. 
Validation comes from actors‘ acceptance of the model as an adequate description of their 
problem  and  as  a  useful  tool  to  address  it.  This  approach  is  better  than  experiments  in 
providing  insight  into  agents‘  representations  in  the  real-world,  but  allows  only  limited 
control  and  replicability;  its  findings  are  often  context-dependent,  and  accumulation  of 
empirically-based knowledge is relatively difficult (Rouchier (2007)). To date, stakeholder 
involvement  models  are  less  common  in  economics  than  in  other  social  sciences,  more 
familiar with fieldwork observations. 
 
2.5  Diversity of modeling approaches 
Constrained maximization at individual and equilibrium at collective levels form the 
core principles of neoclassical economics and give it some degree of unity and consistency. In 
contrast, ACE models share only minimal commonalities and are in fact very diverse. One 
reason is that the standard utility maximization and perfect information hypotheses admit not 
one but many alternatives: hence, their removal opens the way to a variety of choice criteria 
ranging  from  Zero-Intelligence  to  sophisticated  learning  processes,  and  to  differing 
assumptions about how agents collect, process and accumulate information. Although use of 
experimental or other data can restrict  the range of possible options,  no  decision-making   17 
model has emerged as a universally valid alternative so far; rather, many researchers believe 
that the context of choice may determine which conception is most appropriate in each case. 
Modeling frameworks are also heterogeneous. For instance, ACE representations of the 
market often follow the experimental economics tradition of assigning reservation values to 
each buyer and seller, and then deriving aggregate supply and demand schedules by sorting 
seller values from lowest to highest and buyer values from highest to lowest. While allowing 
for straightforward linkages between agent simulations and human subject experiments, this 
approach does not facilitate comparison with standard microeconomics arguments, typically 
framed in terms of preferences, utility functions, and endowments. The main reason for this 
gap is that the experimental/ACE method draws heavily on Marshallian analysis, which was 
very much in the minds of the pioneers of market experiments such as Edward Chamberlin 
and Vernon Smith, but was at the same time losing ground elsewhere and has now virtually 
disappeared from microeconomics textbooks (Tubaro (2009)). 
The  community  of  agent-based  modelers  has  recognized  that  heterogeneity  of 
assumptions  and  frameworks  of  analysis  may  hinder  comparability  and  transferability  of 
knowledge  between  models  (Fagiolo,  Moneta  and  Windrum  (2007)).  Because  computer 
simulation does not allow proofs as in deductive logic or mathematics, but only inductive 
reasoning, then reliability of a result is higher if it is reproduced by different modelers and/or 
on different software and hardware platforms. Hence, many researchers insist on the need to 
replicate, re-write and compare models more systematically (Hales, Rouchier and Edmonds 
(2003)), and some have gone as  far as  to  propose a common protocol (Leombruni  et  al. 
(2006)).  
An issue that has been less widely discussed in the literature is ACE‘s distinctiveness in 
the choice of its objects of study. To be sure, some of them overlap with those of previous 
economic  theories,  for  instance  the  general  principles  regulating  price  formation  and  the 
coordinating capacities of decentralized market economies (e.g. Gode and Sunder  (1993); 
Weisbuch, Kirman and Herreiner (2000); Axtell (2005); Gintis (2007)). Yet they also include 
a  broad  range  of  less  conventional  issues.  Specifically,  ACE  goes  beyond  the  traditional 
neoclassical view in which all inter-individual interactions are mediated by market prices, and 
explores a larger variety of coordinating processes and mechanisms. For instance, ACE draws 
on insight from game theory and experimental economics (Ostrom and Walker (2005)) to 
study  how  trust  and  reciprocity  may  appear  in  situations  of  imperfect  information  or 
uncertainty, in which agents can choose between cooperative or defective behaviors. Under 
these conditions, an agent may accept to be vulnerable to the actions of another based on the   18 
expectation that the other will cooperate; this is all the more likely as interactions are repeated 
over time and agents have the possibility to reciprocate. Agent-based models of trust and 
reciprocity can be used to explain, among other things, the formation of long-term business 
relationships between firms and their suppliers and customers (e.g. Kim (2009)).  
Other questions that ACE models deal with include loyalty, which may arise in cases in 
which  heterogeneous  agents  interact  repeatedly  and  at  each  step,  choose  which  agent  to 
interact with and which actions to perform. Loyalty has been especially explored in the study 
of perishable good markets (fruits, vegetables, and fish), where buyer/seller interactions are 
repeated on a daily basis due to limited possibilities to form stocks, and participants are very 
dependent on the regularity, and predictability, of their interactions. It has been shown that 
loyalty towards the same buyers or sellers increases predictability and thus market efficiency, 
while  opportunism  (i.e.  shopping  around  for  the  cheapest  prices)  makes  transactions  less 
predictable,  lowers  efficiency,  and  increases  waste  (Rouchier  (2004),  Kirman  and  Vriend 
(2000)). Reputation also has a place in ACE models of the market. It matters when buyers 
need to choose from among a group of sellers but have imperfect information on the quality 
of the goods or services on offer; in such cases, they can take the reputation of a seller, i.e. 
other buyers‘ judgment, as an indicator of quality. This principle may give rise to complex 
dynamic interactions in which sellers endeavor to improve the image they convey to buyers 
and the latter exchange with each other information about sellers. In the absence of other 
sources of information, use of reputation as an indicator can lead to strong potential gains in 
terms of buyer and seller satisfaction (Rouchier (2008)). To give another example, agent-
based models also consider endogeneity of consumer preferences due to social influence. The 
idea  is  that  tastes  and  preferences  may  evolve  following  the  marketing  and  advertising 
strategies of firms (Janssen and Jager (2003)) or peer influence, with social processes such as 
imitation, social comparison and status-seeking (Dosi et al. (1999); Kemp (1999)), which give 
rise in some cases to forms of conspicuous consumption as those originally described by 
Thorstein Veblen (Friedman and Ostrov (2008)). 
Clearly, inclusion of non-traditional topics is not only due to linkages with experimental 
economics research; nor does it entirely derive from the specific assumptions of ACE and its 
emphasis on imperfect information, non-deductive reasoning, non-Walrasian framework of 
analysis.  It is  also  related to  ACE‘s  closeness  with  neighboring disciplines;  in  particular, 
sociology  already  has  a  long  tradition  of  investigating  relationships  between  market 
participants  that  are  not  mediated  by  prices,  and  may  involve  coexistence  of  forms  of 
competition and cooperation (Smelser and Swedberg (2005)).   19 
Combinations of new hypotheses, new tools and new topics allow ACE to explore a 
wider range of ―possible worlds‖, and by so doing, to enrich economists‘ understanding of the 
market mechanism. This perspective is all the more promising as an increasing amount of 
research  is  done  in  parallel  with  experimental  and  game-theoretic  work,  not  to  mention 
psychological and sociological research. Nevertheless, widening of topics together with inputs 
from  other  disciplines  may  hamper  comparison  with  other  parts  of  economics  and  make 
interpretation of ACE  models less straightforward. This may discourage other economists 
from developing an interest in the field. 
 
3.  The impact of ACE on the methodology of economics 
Based on the discussion conducted so far, it is now possible to frame a broad reflection 
on the relationships between ACE and economic methodology. A first issue is, of course, that 
computer simulation is commonly perceived as less rigorous than the logical deduction and 
mathematics  that  imposed  themselves  as  primary  tools  for  economic  reasoning  in  the 
aftermath of World War II, with the seminal contributions of Paul Samuelson and the Arrow-
Debreu  general  equilibrium  model.  In  this  sense,  computer  simulation  is  bound  to  be 
suspicious for many mathematically-trained economists. 
Yet the ongoing tendency is to broaden the range of admissible methods of research in 
economics, and to lessen the centrality of the abstract, deductive mathematical method that 
was dominant until recently. Increasingly sophisticated statistical and econometric techniques 
(e.g. instrumental variables, matching, difference-in-difference, etc.) have raised the prestige 
of empirical research; laboratory experiments are much more widely performed, and field 
experiments are gaining ground, for instance in the fight against poverty; even neuro-imaging 
is attracting growing attention by economists. The result is a remarkable diversification of the 
permissible methodologies. Though not identical to pure mathematics, these methods are all 
based on some kind of quantitative or scientific reasoning and are increasingly demanding in 
terms of the technical and methodological skills that are necessary to apply them –a reason 
that partly explains their perceived solidity and their newly-earned status in economics. To the 
extent that computer simulation can be seen as part of this trend, it may benefit from it and 
contribute, in turn, to transform economics.  
Further, the growing amount of methodological reflection on validation and verification 
issues  that  has  been  recently  developed  within  the  ACE  community  may  have  wider 
repercussions as it raises the very general questions of cross-model comparability, generation 
of cumulative knowledge, relationship between theory and data, interpretation of empirical   20 
findings.  It may also  cross-fertilize with what is currently being done in other fields, for 
instance concerning replication, data quality, and reporting of results, which are also widely 
discussed in relation to (among other things) applied econometrics.  
The preceding sections also show that ACE contributes to shaping a novel theory of 
individual economic behavior, taking into account human cognitive limits on the one hand, 
and the existence of decision-making situations for which pure deduction is inappropriate on 
the other hand. In this perspective, agent-based models appear as valuable complements to 
game theory and experimental/behavioral economics; more precisely by studying interactions 
and two-way feedback effects, they provide insight into the possible implications of different 
behavioral assumptions in a given social context. In particular, a major result of ACE research 
is that neoclassical utility maximization and perfect information hypotheses are much less 
general than what is usually thought, and apply in fact only to a sub-set of choice problems. 
Agent-based market models provide especially strong evidence that a number of standard 
economic  results  rely  less  on  rational  choice  theory  than  is  typically  assumed.  Indeed  in 
single-market  models,  the  same  supply-and-demand  equilibrium  obtains  both  with  utility 
maximizing and with ―Zero-Intelligence‖ agents (Gode and Sunder (1993); Gode and Sunder 
(1997)):  this  result  confirms  that  the  familiar  supply  and  demand  model,  of  Marshallian 
origin,  is  a  good  predictor  of  market  outcomes  and  is  robust  to  changes  in  individual 
behavioral assumptions. In light of this result, computer simulation can be said to provide a 
new way to test the consistency of existing theories and to assess the precise role of each of 
their underlying assumptions. 
Another feature of ACE which raises questions for the methodology of economics is its 
embeddedness in an interdisciplinary context. Major contributions to the methodological and 
substantive development of ACE came from fields of research outside economics, and cross-
disciplinary  dialogue  and  exchange  are  widespread  within  the  agent-based  modeling 
community.  This  process  has  allowed  ACE  economists  to  absorb  contents  from  other 
disciplines over time, and to transform their work accordingly –in an attitude opposed to the 
infamous ―imperialist‖ tradition  of the discipline.  This  tendency  has  both  advantages  and 
disadvantages. Interdisciplinary relationships enrich economic reflection with new research 
questions, variables, and assumptions. The drawback is that insight from other disciplines 
may hinder comparison with  intra-disciplinary theories and results; as a result, it may be 
difficult to assess ACE findings and their contribution to a better understanding of economic 
phenomena. In the next few years, the challenge for ACE will be to strike a balance between 
the two opposite needs of maintaining interdisciplinary contacts and enhancing dialogue with   21 
other parts of economics. The extent to which it will succeed in doing so will determine its 
future place in a renewed, but methodologically highly demanding, economics discipline.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
This  paper  has  endeavored  to  provide  an  overview  of  ACE  from  a  methodological 
viewpoint. It has reviewed similarities and differences with respect to existing economics, 
methodological issues, and wider implications for the discipline as a whole. Emphasis has 
been placed on how ACE shares the long-lasting concern of the economics discipline for the 
unintended social consequences of purposeful individual action. More to the point, evidence 
has  been  provided  of  complementarities  between  ACE  and  state-of-the-art  research  in 
experimental and behavioral economics as well as game theory, in a common effort to revise 
and renew economic theory. In particular, ACE has reinforced the experimental finding that 
key economic results rely less on rational choice theory than is usually assumed, and has 
provided insight into the importance of market structures and rules in yielding market-level 
outcomes. It has also enlarged the range of behaviors that are of interest for economists to 
understand  the  functioning  of  markets,  by  taking  into  account  interactions  that  are  not 
mediated  by  prices.  In  this  perspective,  ACE  appears  as  a  useful  supplement  to  existing 
economic  tools  rather  than  a  radically  different  alternative,  and  has  potential  for  better 
integration into economics in the years to come.  Although methodological issues such as 
those that concern validation and verification are still to be addressed, a great deal of work has 
already been done and may cross-fertilize with reflection in other areas of economics. Finally, 
the historically strong linkages with other disciplines may  yield further advantages in the 
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